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Abstract
It is sometimes claimed that Gricean communication is necessarily a form of cooperative or ‘joint’ action. A consequence of this Cooperative Communication View is that Gricean communication could not itself contribute to an explanation of the possibility of joint action. I argue that even though Gricean communication is often a form of joint action, it is not necessarily so – since it does not always require intentional action on the part of a hearer. Rejecting the Cooperative Communication View has attractive consequences for our theorising about human cognitive development, since it opens up the possibility of appealing to communicative interaction to explain the emergence of joint action in phylogeny. 













Gricean Communication, Joint Action, and the Evolution of Cooperation

‘If we are to understand the ultimate origins of human communication, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, we must look outside communication itself and into human cooperation more generally.’ (Tomasello 2008, p.6.)

1. Introduction 
Joint actions are actions performed by multiple agents who are acting together. Acting together typically implies the following:
(i)	There is plural number of agents p acting intentionally in pursuit of a common goal g.
(ii)	The members of p are willing to support one another’s contributions to achieving g, by acting intentionally to help one another achieve g.
(iii)	There is common knowledge of (i)-(iii) among the members of p.​[1]​
In line with the above characterisation, a paradigmatic case of joint action would be our collaborating to build a tree house. If you hammered in the planks that I held in place, while I made sure you had the tools that you needed to do this, then in the process of realising our common goal g, we would have supported one another in a manner consistent with (ii). If this were common knowledge between us then the above criteria for joint action would be satisfied.

Clause (ii) of the above formulation characterises the feature of joint action – namely collaborative effort – that will be the central focus of the paper to come. It specifies the way in which joint action makes demands on participants, by requiring that the members of p be willing to make sacrifices for one another to help realise their common goal. For example, it may be that as we build our tree house my job of holding the planks in place bores me. However, I am willing to do it because I recognise that it will help us (and therefore me) to get our tree house built. On this account, then, joint action requires the existence of partners who are willing to commit their efforts to the realisation of the common goal – and who are willing to act intentionally to do so. 

The paper to come will focus on the motivational requirements of joint action and Gricean communication, and the extent to which Gricean communication is collaborative effort in the sense just described. I will not discuss further the role of common knowledge in joint action (although see Moore 2013a; Blomberg, 2015 for relevant discussion). Nor will I discuss the cognitive pre-requisites of Gricean communication – a subject on which I have written elsewhere (Moore 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, submitted). 

2. Communication and Cooperation
While some types of action could be performed either by individuals working together or acting alone, other types of action are intrinsically joint; they could be performed only by individuals acting together. A common candidate for an intrinsically joint action is communication (Tomasello 2008; Jankovic 2013). This is perhaps unsurprising. On classical views of communication, one cannot act with communicative intent in the absence of an intended audience (Grice 1957).​[2]​ At least in standard cases, then, communication is a plural action – that is, one that requires multiple subjects.

Furthermore, at least some cases of communication are paradigmatically cases of joint action. In conversations, for example, speaker and hearer often work together to realise a common goal state in which the hearer understands the speaker’s communicative intention. To this end interlocutors might interrupt one another to ask for clarification of an ambiguous utterance, as in the following: 
S: <pointing> One of those please.
	H: Are you pointing to the croissants or the pains au chocolat?
	S: A croissant please. 
Such requests for clarification are paradigmatic of cases in which speaker and hearer work together to realise (ii). If such exchanges are representative of communication, then many communicative interactions are joint actions. This may be what Grice had in mind when he wrote that:
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognises in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. (Grice 1989, p.26)
In making this point, Grice argued that conversations are characteristically cooperative activities, and that hearers can use the assumption of cooperation as a basis for interpreting the ambiguous utterances of their interlocutors. 

While it is uncontroversial the communication is often a case of joint action, the question at the heart of this paper is whether communication is necessarily a form of joint action. For example, do I engage in a joint action with a stranger when I hurl insults at him from the top of a bridge? To ask such a question is to ask whether the cooperative motivations that Grice identified as at work in his writings on the logic of conversation (Grice 1967a) are in some sense already implicated in or entailed by his writings on the nature of intentional communication (Grice 1957, 1967b). 

The claim that Gricean communication is intrinsically cooperative has been defended by a number of authors. For example, Jankovic (2013) argues that in any communicative act, the second clause of Grice’s analysis of communicative intent – the requirement that S intend that H recognise her intention (1) that H produce some response r - should be understood as an invitation to joint action. She writes that
Standard Gricean communication is an essentially intentional collective action type (an EIC). Like line dancing or playing catch, it is a type of action that can only be performed by the utterer and the audience acting together intentionally. (Jankovic 2013, pp.489-90)
Jankovic’s thesis does not claim that all Gricean communication is cooperative and so she would not take herself to be a proponent of the necessity claim that I consider here. However, she does claim that since Gricean communication is essentially cooperative, non-standard cases must be understood as conceptually derivative from the cooperative case (Jankovic 2013, p.490) – and some of her arguments can be interpreted as supporting the necessity view.

Tomasello (2008) is committed to the claim that Gricean communication is necessarily cooperative. Like Jankovic, he also argues that clause (2) of Grice’s analysis should be characterised by an appeal to joint action. In his words, the ‘fundamentally cooperative nature of human communication is … the basic insight of Grice’ (Tomasello 2008, p.6).​[3]​

The claim that Gricean communication is necessarily a form of joint action may seem counter-intuitive. Grice’s analysis of non-natural meaning (1957, 1967b) specified a set of intentions that require a speaker to take account of her interlocutor’s mental states in order to act with communicative intent. However, this analysis did not require that a hearer engage in intentional action in order for a speaker to act communicatively. It specified only what speakers must do for communication to be possible. In that case, if Gricean communication is necessarily a joint action, the argument for this conclusion must be unpacked. It is not straightforwardly entailed by Grice’s analysis of meaning.  

3. Inference and Attention
Tomasello and Jankovic offer complementary arguments for the claim that intentional communication is a form of joint action, because its success turns on both speaker and hearer acting intentionally so that a hearer might recover the speaker’s message.

Although Jankovic argues at length that communication is essentially a joint action, she gives only one illustration of the sort of interaction between speaker and hearer that she thinks makes this so. Here she writes that the most minimal unit of communicative interaction ‘involves cooperation between two participants where the role of one … is to (e.g.) speak to the other and of the other to cooperatively attend to what the speaker says’ (Jankovic 2013). The guiding assumption here must be that unless a hearer H carefully attends to what the speaker S says, he will be unable to recover her communicative intention. While Jankovic’s claim is consistent with Tomasello’s view, the latter makes a series of further claims. The central idea on which Tomasello’s version of the Cooperative Communication View hangs is that (as described by Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 2001) human communication cannot be modelled on any simple code, according to which speakers and hearers produce and decode utterances without engaging in a process of attention and inference. Rather at least in the human case, a speaker offers evidence for her goal by ostensively addressing to her interlocutor a sign or combination of signs that give expression to her communicative goal. On the basis of this evidence, the hearer endeavours to infer what the speaker’s communicative goal could be.​[4]​

On this ‘ostensive-inferential’ model, intentional communication always requires an inference about the speaker’s goal, because in the absence of a fully determined linguistic code, there will always be a gap between the conventional meaning of what a speaker says, and what she seeks to communicate by uttering. As a result of this ‘pragmatic gap’, unless a hearer is willing to invest cognitive effort in trying to figure out what a speaker intends to communicate, he will fail to recover her message. This makes communication a joint action in the sense that, when a speaker S produces a message in pursuit of some goal g, S and H must work together to unpack the content of S’s message. On Tomasello’s account, this involves intentional action on the part of each interlocutor: S will choose vocabulary that she thinks H will understand; and H will invest cognitive effort to unpack S’s intended goal – by attending to what she said, and inferring the goal that motivated her to speak.

Thus Jankovic and Tomasello identify two ways in which speaker and hearer must engage in joint action for intentional communication to be possible. Since on their views attention and inference are pre-requisites of utterance comprehension, they should endorse the claim that even in minimal cases of successful intentional communication, comprehension occurs because speaker and hearer engage in joint action. Thus, at the level of utterance interpretation even the insult-hurler and his victim engage in joint action. 

4. Pro-Social Content
In addition to arguing that Gricean communication is cooperative at the level of interpretation, Tomasello (2008) defends a further claim too. The claim, recently taken up (in part) by Sperber et al. (2010), is that since communication is a form of joint action, it must also be cooperative in a second sense: ‘the communicator’s proximate goal must be somehow to help or share with the recipient’ (Tomasello 2008, p.15). A paradigmatic example that Tomasello gives of this is pointing to inform others of the location of food. 

Such pro-social motivations are necessary, argues Tomasello, because of the ostensive-inferential nature of communication. Since H will infer S’s communicative intention only if he expends cognitive energy, then he must be given some incentive to start the process of interpretation. The incentive comes in the form of a background assumption that the content of S’s utterance will be somehow beneficial to H. Thus the pragmatic gap characteristic of human communication can be overcome only because communicators are fundamentally cooperative – that is, because they perform utterances with the intention of sharing valuable information. 

On Tomasello’s view, it is because speakers know that hearers must be given an incentive to start interpretation that they advertise the fact that they have communicative intentions by performing their utterances ostensively. Thus he takes the second clause of Grice’s analysis to give expression to at least part of this cooperative framework for intentional communication:
Because the communicator knows [that his interlocutor expects him to volunteer helpful information], he makes sure that the recipient knows that he is attempting to communicate, as if to say ‘You’re going to want to know this’. … This additional layer of intentionality – ‘I want you to know that I want something from you’ – is absolutely crucial to the process and is most commonly referred to as the (Gricean) communicative intention. (Tomasello 2008, pp.88-89) 
Against the background of expected cooperation, hearers are receptive to speakers’ advertising of their communicative intentions. When addressed communicatively by others, they are willing to expend cognitive effort trying to interpret their messages, since they expect to gain from learning whatever it is that speakers would have them grasp. In this way, speaker and hearer work together to unpack the speaker’s message. Again, Tomasello emphasises that this becomes possible only against a background of expected cooperation:
The main point is that this process occurs because both participants know together and trust together the cooperative motivations involved. (Tomasello 2008, p.90)

Tomasello’s characterisation makes Gricean communication cooperative in two distinct ways. First, it is cooperative because communication is a process of joint action. This form of cooperation has two parts, pertaining to the respective roles of speaker and hearer in the communicative interaction.
	1: Cooperation at the level of utterance formation and interpretation:
o	(i) Speakers formulate utterances so as to facilitate hearer comprehension.
o	(ii) Hearers invest cognitive effort into interpreting the speaker’s message. 
Second, it is because cooperative motives must be mutually assumed to be present if the process of interpretation is to get started.
	2: Cooperation at the level of utterance content: Speaker and hearer work on the assumption that when S speaks, she will provide information from which H will gain. 

5. The Emergence of Gricean Communication in Phylogeny
Tomasello’s claims about the cooperative foundations of Gricean communication are important because they entail a further claim about the emergence of distinctively human forms of communication in phylogeny.​[5]​ On his account, after Homo split from our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos (around 6mya), our early hominin ancestors had to undergo what Habermas calls ‘an improbable moral revolution of motives’ (Habermas 2011, footnote 6) before they could come to be Gricean communicators. In the course of this revolution, our ancestors needed to become cooperative in two ways that (Tomasello argues) chimpanzees are not. First, they would have had to engage in new forms of joint action, in which they would become willing to invest time and cognitive effort to help others realise common goals. Second, they would have had to acquire new motivations to share valuable information with others. 

Since sharing valuable resources deprives one of the ability to monopolise them oneself, in practice both forms of behaviour might have a common source – namely the willingness to incur a cost to help another. Empirical evidence suggests that apes are comparatively poor at doing this, though. For example, chimpanzees are at least sometimes indifferent to the welfare of others. Even when doing so requires little effort on their part, they decline to release food to a conspecific when doing so does not benefit them (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen, Hare, Call and Tomasello 2006). Warneken and Tomasello (2006) found that hand-reared chimpanzees were willing to help a familiar zookeeper reach an out-of-reach tool, even when they were not rewarded for doing so. However, even while chimpanzees were not rewarded in this task, the same apes were often rewarded for similar tasks in the past – suggesting that expectations of reward might still have driven this result. Melis et al. (2010) found that chimpanzees were willing to pay a cost to allow conspecifics to retrieve food for themselves. However, until this finding is replicated, an appropriately cautious conclusion would be that even if chimpanzees are sometimes helpful, particularly when the costs of helping are low, such behaviour is rare. 

With respect to their production of communicative acts, apes are also largely self-interested. While wild chimpanzees produce calls to warn ignorant others of danger (Crockford et al. 2012), pro-social motivations like these appear rare.​[6]​ For example, another study of captive chimpanzees showed that they point to show a human experimenter the location of a needed tool only when they expect that that tool will be used to benefit them. By contrast, two-year-old children pointed to indicate the location of the tool to the experimenter whether or not they stood to gain from doing so (Bullinger, Zimmerman, Kaminski and Tomasello 2011). 

It could be argued that these findings do not show that chimpanzees are motivationally incapable of Gricean communication, since they suggest only that apes would not reliably invest their attention and effort in interpreting another’s message if they did not expect to gain from doing so. Where apes could predict that their interpretative efforts would pay off, they may still be motivated to engage. Nonetheless, even if interpretation sometimes occurred, apes’ cooperative tendencies may still be insufficiently robust to make pragmatically rich communication viable. There are a number of reasons to think this conclusion plausible.

First, given the possibility of acting alone or collaborating, when the payoff is the same chimpanzees prefer to work alone (Bullinger, Melis and Tomasello 2011). Unlike humans, then, chimpanzees may be intrinsically unmotivated to collaborate. Furthermore, when they do engage in collaborative activity in return for a larger payoff, chimpanzees have shown themselves to be unreliable communicators – even when it would benefit them to engage in communication. In a pair of studies (Bullinger, Wyman, Melis and Tomasello 2011; Duguid et al. 2014), Tomasello and colleagues tested chimpanzees’ use of communication in a ‘stag hunt’ scenario. In the stag hunt, two agents can work together to secure a large reward (the ‘stag’) – but by committing to hunt the stag, each must forego the possibility of working individually to obtain a smaller but more secure reward (the ‘hare’). If both opt in to hunt the stag, then they each receive a bigger reward than they could obtain individually. If both opt out, then each still receives a hare. However, if only one commits to hunting the stag, then that individual gets nothing. Given this payoff structure, it pays to hunt the stag only where one can be confident that others will do their bit; and so it would benefit all if individuals signalled their intention to hunt in advance. In a series of studies, chimpanzees who had been trained to understand the payoff structure of this game used communication to coordinate their strategies in only a small minority (≈10%) of cases; and they never communicated before abandoning the hare in pursuit of the stag. Rather, they used low-level cues (like motion cues) to decide when to act. Thus they seem unaware of the potential of using communication to facilitate collaborative activity – by, for example, volunteering information that would facilitate decision-making in potential collaborators. 

Perhaps because they do not expect others to volunteer useful information, chimpanzees also seem to be poor at making use of it when it is offered to them. Tomasello has argued that one reason why chimpanzees are poor at pointing comprehension is that human points are produced with pro-social motivations that are alien to apes (Herrmann and Tomasello 2006; Tomasello 2006, 2008). He argues that apes fail to disambiguate the possible interpretations of such points because they fail to predict that anyone would volunteer useful information to them. If apes could predict that pointers were providing pro-social information, they might invest more time and effort in trying to interpret others’ messages, and so perform better in comprehension tasks.​[7]​ 

While these findings are insufficient to conclude that chimpanzees never engage in pragmatic interpretation, they do suggest that pragmatically rich communication may – if the Cooperative Communication View is correct – not be viable in chimpanzees. Thus, there is empirical support for Tomasello’s conclusion that chimpanzees lack the pro-social motivations for communication that requires collaboration at this level. If our ancestors were motivationally more like chimpanzees than us, they would need to undergo a ‘moral revolution’ before Gricean communication became possible. 

These claims about the motivational foundations of Gricean communication are independent of any concerns about the cognitive foundations of Gricean communication. Many (e.g., Tomasello 2008; Corballis 2012; Scott-Phillips 2014; 2015) have argued that there are good cognitive reasons for thinking that chimpanzees could not be Gricean communicators. Some (Gómez 1994; Moore 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, submitted) argue that such concerns are misplaced. However, even if one accepted that apes are cognitively capable of Gricean communication, if Tomasello’s Cooperative Communication View is right, there would still be substantial motivational barriers to thinking chimpanzees capable of Gricean communication.

Later in this paper I will argue that there is evidence of intentional pragmatic interpretation in isolated cases of chimpanzee communication – such that apes may already possess motivations required for joint action. First, though, I argue that the Cooperative Communication View is false, because it overstates the amount of intentional action that hearers in Gricean communicative actions must undertake. Consequently, reluctance to engage in joint action need not be a barrier to Gricean communication. 

6. Evaluating the Cooperative Communication View
According to Jankovic and Tomasello, Gricean communication is a joint action because its success requires that S and H work together to realise a state in which H understands S’s message. In what follows, I argue against this conclusion on the grounds that utterance interpretation is sometimes an automatic, non-intentional process. Therefore, since joint action is a species of intentional action, utterance interpretation cannot be a necessarily joint action. Before developing this argument, I turn to Tomasello’s claim that Gricean communication requires pro-social motives. 

6.1. Must the Content of Communicative Acts be Pro-social?
Tomasello argues that since the interpretation of communicative intentions is effortful, hearers must have some incentive to engage in it. While he claims that this entails that utterance contents must be pro-social, in fact it doesn’t follow that hearers could be motivated to interpret only by the expectation of reward.  To give one counter-example, they could also be motivated to interpret a speaker’s goal by the desire to avoid harm.

Consider the case of an inarticulate dictator who issues orders to her subjects and expects them to be fulfilled. Suppose that the dictator is both extremely poor at articulating the particular goals that she would like to see realised, and that the contents of her utterances are not pro-social, since the orders that she gives specify onerous tasks that her subjects must produce to please her. Finally, suppose that when the dictator’s subjects fail to please her, she executes them. In cases like this, subjects would certainly be motivated to try to interpret the dictator’s utterances. However, this motivation would result not from any expectation of gain, so much as the avoidance of some terrible harm. Since this is not cooperative in the senses to which Tomasello appeals, pro-social expectations constitute just one possible motivation to interpret among others. 

We should consequently adopt a weaker construal of the way in which the addressees of communicative acts come to be motivated to engage in pragmatic interpretation. Using insights taken from Tomasello, Sperber and colleagues adopt a weaker formulation, according to which ‘the normally expected benefit is to acquire some true and relevant information’ (Sperber et al. 2010, p.360). This formulation is more inclusive because whereas Tomasello spells out his appeal to cooperative motivations in terms of altruistic motivations, Sperber et al. require only that hearers expect the contents of utterances to be ‘relevant’ to them. This weaker constraint makes no claim about the way in which a hearer should expect to benefit from interpreting the speaker’s utterances. Once we concede that the content of a message need be only relevant its hearer, the inclination to suppose that utterance production must be pro-social disappears. 

A further assumption shared by Tomasello (2008) and by Sperber et al. (2010) should also be challenged. They hold that since utterance interpretation is costly, it needs to be motivated by expected rewards. While this may often be true, since interpretation costs are not uniformly costly, utterance interpretation may also sometimes be inexpensive. If this is right, then the expected payoff required to justify a hearer’s engaging in utterance interpretation should be expressed as a conditional.
Where utterance interpretation costs are high, hearers will need to be highly motivated to pay those costs.
This is consistent with the possibility that utterance interpretation costs may sometimes be minimal; and that where this is so, hearers need not be strongly motivated to engage in interpretation. Indeed, in some cases, interpretation may be so effortless that the process begins and ends without H even considering the possibility of his gaining from the information provided by S, and with his being only minimally motivated to attend to and interpret her utterance. 

The acknowledgement that utterance interpretation costs may not always be high has further implications for the Cooperative Communication View. For it may be that interpretation sometimes makes such minimal demands on attention and interpretation that utterance interpretation is not the result of a process of intentional reflection and attention. Hearers may immediately grasp the content of a speaker’s messages, without having to attend to and reflect on what she said. Thus understanding may simply happen to them – perhaps as the result of processes that are sub-personal and/or automatic – without being the result of any process on which they could intervene and stop. If this is the case, though, utterance comprehension does not always require intentional action. Where it does not require intentional action, it is not a form of joint action. 

6.2. Must Interpretation Always Require Intentional Action?
(i) The role of attention in utterance interpretation
According to Jankovic, a minimal requirement for successful communication involves a hearer ‘cooperatively attending’ to what the speaker says. Such attention will sometimes be needed. For example, if your communicative goal is expressed via a long speech, then the attentional demands on grasping your point may be high. In other cases, though, this claim is implausible. If a minimal constraint of intentional action is that an agent could choose not to perform it, then there are cases in which audiences hear or see utterances without acting intentionally. For example, if I hear a slur shouted from behind me, then my attention may be seized by that utterance independently of intentional behaviour on my part. So even if attending is often an intentional activity, at least some cases of attention shifting are not under intentional control. Often unintentional processes like these will suffice to ensure than an utterance is seen or heard. 

Even where an audience is momentarily inattentive, skilful communicators can use their knowledge of how to address their utterances to ensure that their utterances are seen or heard. For example, if I want to gesture to you, I might approach you and engage you in eye contact, before producing my utterance. Speakers can act with communicative intent even where attention cannot be taken for granted – because one can intend to F so long as one does not believe that F-ing is impossible (Grice 1989). Since attempts to communicate with inattentive interlocutors will often be successful, competent speakers can intend to communicate with inattentive others. In these cases, though, a hearer’s ability to hear a speaker’s words (or see her gestures) need not be the result of intentional action - even if the processes of listening and attending are sometimes under intentional control. In many cases, H’s grasping of what S said will be passive – the result of S’s knowing how to address herself to H, in conditions in which he will be receptive. 

(ii) The role of reflection in utterance interpretation
Just as hearing or perceiving what a speaker said need not require intentional action, sometimes intentional action on H’s part will also be unnecessary for interpretation. In cases of clear ambiguity, a hearer may sometimes engage in reflective interpretation in order to recover the speaker’s message. (Consider the case of the neurotic individual who spends hours dwelling on possible interpretations of a lover’s short text message.) In other cases, though, interpretation can be automatic and unreflective. Here utterance comprehension is something that happens to us, not something that we intentionally do. 

This means that while utterance interpretation sometimes requires concerted attention and reflective interpretation, sometimes it does not. Consequently, while communicative interaction may sometimes take the form of a joint action, interpretation cannot require joint action. If this is right, the Cooperative Communication View is false: intentional communication is not necessarily a form of joint action, even if it often is. 

7. Implications of this Conclusion
This conclusion is important, because it allows us to reverse the view of the phylogenetic development of communication and joint action developed in section (5). On Tomasello’s view, Gricean communication became possible only after humans developed the motivations required for joint action. However, if some forms of utterance interpretation do not require intentional action on the part of a hearer, then these utterance types could potentially be used as tools for initiating forms of joint action. If (as argued above) a hearer’s expected pay-off for engaging in interpretation should proportional to his expected gain from interpretation, then where interpretation costs are low, hearers need not expect to be substantially rewarded for their interpretative efforts. 

If this is right, then in theorising about human phylogeny we can make sense of a possible class of very simple speech acts for which interpretation costs are minimal, and where hearers’ success in interpretation need not turn on expectations of reward. Subsequently, we can appeal to such speech acts in giving an account of the possible origins of joint action. Supposing for the sake of argument that these speech acts can be produced with Gricean intentions - namely, intentions specifying that S intend (1) that H produce some r, and (2) that H recognise S’s intention (1) (and so on) (Grice 1957; Moore submitted) – then we can appeal to Gricean acts to explain the possible emergence of joint action in phylogeny, in a way that is not available to proponents of the Cooperative Communication View. For example, we can now consider the possibility of a group of individuals who lacked the motivation to engage in joint action, but who came to appreciate its potential for reward through a process of communicative interaction. 

Such a situation might occur if, for example, one individual who was both influential and knowledgeable were able to use such utterance types to coordinate the activities of others in ways that served to benefit all. For example, suppose that I alone in our group was able to appreciate the possibility that by collaborating, we could hunt for a large animal (the ‘stag’), and thereby eat better than if we foraged alone (the ‘hare’). One way in which I might be able to bring others to grasp the possibilities of joint action would be by telling them. If I were able to produce an easily understood utterance to communicate to you the possible benefits of successful coordination, such communication might engender in you a new appreciation for the beneficial possibilities of joint action. Alternatively, I might produce simple and easily understood utterances to let you know when I was leaving to hunt the stag, thereby improving our chances of coordinating successfully. This telling need not take the form of an extended monologue. For example, if I had a phrase for “Meat!” I could simply repeat this while gesturing in the direction of my intended prey. 

In such cases we need not assume altruistic motivations on the part of the speaker. I might simply be using you as a tool for securing a larger quantity of food for myself. After experiencing the successful stag hunt, though, we might both come to appreciate the benefits of collaboration. This might in turn motivate you to invest further effort in interpreting my utterances; which in turn might enable me to attempt more complex forms of social coordination, using utterances that were less easy to interpret. If subsequent interactions enhanced our survival capacity, then selection pressures would emerge favouring those who were able to make more complex inferences about communicative goals, and who were motivated to spend time and energy undertaking such inferences. At the same time, partly as a consequence of our successful communication, we might both acquire insights into the value of collaborative activity - motivating both of us to engage in more pro-social communication, as a way building valuable allegiances for the future. 

Utterances functionally like those just described need not be performed with Gricean intentions. For example, my uttering to alert you to my leaving to hunt the stag might be an act of expressive communication (Bar-On 2013). I do not deny this possibility; but it is no objection to the claim defended here. The claim here is rather that if speech acts like those just described could be performed with intentions like those described by Grice (Grice 1957; Moore submitted), then at least in principle, a speaker S could act with such intentions, and a hearer H could grasp them, without their engaging in joint action. Consequently the reluctance to engage in joint action is no barrier to Gricean communication. 

8. Objection: Relevance Theory and the Modular Processing of Sentences
With respect to the cases of utterance interpretation described above, it may be objected that even in very simple cases of human communication, interpretation is necessary – even if we are often unaware of our interpretative efforts. This would make the easy-interpretation scenario just outlined misguided.

One motivation for thinking that the above scenarios underestimate the pragmatic interpretation involved in communication would be if the ease with which humans interpret is attributable to our possession of modular adaptations for utterance interpretation – like the Relevance processing module hypothesised by Sperber and Wilson (1995, 2001).​[8]​ If our interpretation of the sentences of a language is supported by the existence of fast and efficient modular processing, then while it may seem to us that pragmatic interpretation is not occurring, appearances would be deceptive: hearers might still be engaging in effortful activity, even if they were unaware of doing so.

A number of things follow from this. A first point is that the existence of pragmatic interpretation does not entail the conclusion that intentional communication requires joint action. For if pragmatic interpretation is handled by subpersonal modules that generate utterance interpretations without requiring reflective attention and interpretation, then intentional communication is still not a process of joint action, since according to the criteria for joint action established at the outset, joint action requires intentional action on the part of both speaker and hearer. This is particularly true since many proponents of Relevance Theory now also hold that what triggers utterance interpretation is a second adaptation – a hardwired sensitivity to ‘ostensive cues’ that indicate to a hearer that a speaker is acting with communicative intent (Csibra 2010; see Moore 2014a for discussion). Proponents of this pair of views hold that utterance interpretation is thus handled by a complementary pair of adaptations neither of which is under a hearer’s intentional control. 

A second point is that even if utterance interpretation is now handled by subpersonal mechanisms, this need not always have been so. Indeed, if the existence of such adaptations were attributable to selective pressures for fast and effortless utterance interpretation in the face of ambiguity, then our early hominin ancestors may not have benefitted from their existence – since selective pressures for processing ease could emerge only against a background of processing that was successful but nonetheless difficult. If that is right, then even if utterance interpretation is now often an unreflective, non-intentional process, it was perhaps not always so. Our ancestors’ may have had to work harder than we do to interpret utterances, and this effort may have required joint action. If so, then Tomasello may be right to claim that Gricean communication proper could emerge in phylogeny only after the emergence of motivations required for joint action. 

One way to resist this conclusion is to recognise that there may nonetheless have been a lexicon that was sufficiently easy to interpret that it did not require intentional, deliberate reflection on the part of the hearer. So long as we recognise that some utterance types are easy to interpret, then we need not reverse the claim that Gricean communication could itself play a role in the phylogenetic development of joint action. 

9. Communication Without Joint Action
To make this story plausible, the plausibility of an easily interpretable lexicon needs to be elaborated. In what follows I argue that there are forms of communication that are easily enough interpreted as to be in principle possible even in the absence of intentional, effortful pragmatic interpretation. This is because, utterances can sometimes provide very robust evidence for the message that they are being used to communicate (Moore 2013b, 2014a; see also Wharton 2009). In such cases the need for pragmatic interpretation may be sufficiently minimal that it takes places below the level of intentional action. Endorsing this view does not require denying that pragmatic interpretation is pervasive in human communication. It simply acknowledges that some varieties of pragmatic interpretation are cognitively unchallenging. 

9.1. Utterances Used in Fixed and Unambiguous Ways
Much recent work on communication takes it for granted that human utterances always require interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1995). What motivates this view is the fact sentences are typically ambiguous, because they under-determine what a speaker could be trying to communicate by uttering them. For example, the sentence ‘John is a soldier’ could potentially be uttered in order to communicate that John dresses in camouflage, that he is dependable in times of conflict, and so on. As a result, when a speaker utters a sentence like this, her interlocutor may need to consider different possible interpretations of S’s intended message. 

Even if one agrees that ambiguity, and therefore pragmatic interpretation, are pervasive features of human communication, one need not think that human communication is problematically ambiguous. What makes interpretation pervasive is that humans use the same sentences to communicate a wide variety of messages. However, this is a contingent feature of our uses of words and sentences, and not a pre-requisite of Gricean communication. There could also be speakers who use their lexicon only in fixed and predictable ways (Moore, submitted). In such cases, utterances would not be problematically ambiguous, and the demands on interpretation could still be minimal. 

9.2. Expressive Behaviours
The interpretability constraints on such a lexicon might be reduced yet further if utterances in this lexicon were also accompanied by ‘expressive behaviours’ (Green 2007; Bar-On 2013). On the account developed by Green and Bar-On, expressive behaviours exhibit both the mental states of individuals and the features of the environment to which these mental states are directed. These include emotional expressions – like anger and sadness – as well as patterns of gaze and attention. For example, if I stare at some feature of my environment with a fearful expression, then it will be apparent to knowledgeable onlookers that I am afraid of that object. If my expressive behaviours were observed by others who understood the significance of my behaviour, such observers would acquire insights into my concurrent mental states.

While on Green’s and Bar-On’s accounts expressive behaviours are explicitly not forms of Gricean communication, where gestures are produced in conjunction with such expressive states, they would facilitate interpretation by providing insight into a speaker’s mental states and likely goals (Moore 2013b, 2014a). For example, a point produced in conjunction with piloerect fur and a fearful expression would provide greater insight into its producer’s communicative intentions that a point produced without. Similarly, bodily gestures (like extended limbs) produced in conjunction with directed gaze are likely to be much more easily interpreted than gestures produced using more arbitrary signs, since such behaviours are reliable indicators that an agent is interested in a feature of the environment. For example, dogs find it easy to interpret pointing gestures produced by humans with their own extended limbs, but struggle to understand similar gestures produced using prosthetic devices (Soproni et al. 2001; Udell et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2015). Gestures produced in conjunction with expressive behaviours therefore make for a repertoire of comparatively easily interpretable gestural acts. 

9.3. Iconic Gestures and Intentional Showing
Other forms of gesture may also be easy to interpret. For example, iconic gestures indicate their contents by virtue of visually resembling the speaker’s message. Thus, in order to tell you how to turn on a tap, I might gesture turning my hand in the manner required. The process by which iconic gestures are interpreted need not entail any recognition of their iconicity, since recognition might turn on simple processes of association. Thus recent work has shown that even though chimpanzees do not produce iconic gestures (and there is no evidence that they understand iconicity (Moore 2014b)), they find it easier to interpret the messages underlying iconic gestures than they do arbitrary gestures used with similar goals (Bohn et al. 2015).  Similarly, some information can be communicated readily by virtue of being intentionally shown (Wharton 2009) or demonstrated (Moore 2013b, in press). 

Finally, even gestures that are known to pose substantial challenges for pragmatic interpretation – like pointing (Tomasello 2008; Moore 2013b) – do not pose uniformly difficult challenges. Different cases of pointing may impose very different requirements on interpretation (Moore, Call and Tomasell, 2015). For example, if I point to a particular bike that happens to belong to your ex-girlfriend, then your ability to interpret this point successfully is likely to be difficult, because knowing my intended message may turn on our mutual knowledge of facts about your relationship. If I think you’re looking for an opportunity to see her, my pointing out her bike might indicate a different goal from a case in which I know you want to avoid her. However, many cases of pointing are much easier to interpret. For example, in cases where a communicator reaches for a highly desirable object located in close personal space, as a way of requesting it, the demands on interpretation may be minimal. 

So long as one is happy to acknowledge the possibility of there existing a lexicon of very easily interpretable signs, then we can appeal to the possibility of using such a lexicon to coordinate activity even prior to the phylogenetic emergence of joint action. 

10. Objection: Acquiring a Lexicon
Even if using an existing lexicon need not always require reflective, intentional pragmatic interpretation, then acquiring one may do. Indeed, in human communication it is uncontroversial that acquiring a lexicon requires a great deal of interpretation on the part of the child, since an adult caregiver’s communicative goals must be inferred in the absence of any knowledge of the meanings of the words and sentences that she utters (Bloom 2000; Tomasello 1999, 2008). Again, though, this need not be problematic. 

The need for pragmatic interpretation in acquiring a human language is likely made greater by the varieties of communication in which humans engage, and because we use arbitrary signs that provide relatively poor evidence for a speaker’s communicative goal (Moore 2013b).  We need not take it for granted that the acquisition of any possible lexicon would require the same amount of interpretation. Consider great apes’ acquisition of gestures. 

10.1. Ontogenetic Ritualisation
The classical view of how apes acquire language has been developed in most detail by Tomasello (2008). Building on insights drawn from Tinbergen (1951), he argues that a large part of the gestural repertoire of chimpanzees consists of signals (‘intention movement signals’) that are ritualised out of non-communicative behaviour. In situations when one individual A performs x, and a second individual B responds by performing y, over time, partners become very good at anticipating what the other will do. When A and B have interacted sufficiently often, B might start to perform y before A has finished performing x. Subsequently, since performing only the first step of x is now sufficient to bring B to do y, A need now gesture only the first part of x when wanting to solicit B to y. Based on the coding of videos documenting mother-infant interactions in captive bonobos, Halina and colleagues (2013) have demonstrated that at least some of the gestures learned by infant bonobos are ritualised from non-communicative action schemas related to the initiation of relevant movements.​[9]​

It is often argued that if ape gestures are acquired through a process of ontogentic ritualisation, then they are not produced with Gricean intentions (Tomasello 2008; Scott-Phillips 2015). In fact this conclusion is false, because it conflates a claim about the acquisition of a lexicon with one about the intentional states required for the use of a lexicon (Moore 2015b). While there could be a functionally communicative lexicon composed of gestures learned through ontogenetic ritualisation and not produced with Gricean intentions, once such gestures had been acquired, there is no reason that cognitively able individuals could not use this lexicon produce utterances with Gricean intentions. They would do this – by definition, and irrespective of any story about acquisition history – just if they produced their gestures with intentions like those described by Grice (1957; Moore 2015b, submitted). If this is true, then a simple and easily interpretable lexicon acquired through ontogenetic ritualisation could potentially be used to coordinate joint action. However, a lexicon acquired via ritualisation need not involve joint action. The participants in the repeated interaction described above need not satisfy any of the criteria for joint action (i)-(iii) identified at the outset.  

If the foregoing arguments are persuasive then, at least in principle, a simple lexicon of signs and symbols could be acquired without joint action. Nonetheless, it may be unsatisfactorily speculative to insist that our ancestors could have interpreted such utterances even without engaging in any intentional processes of attention and reflective interpretation. If that’s the case, successful communication may sometimes have required intentional action on the part of the hearer’s part. Conceding this point need not be fatal. 

11. Communication and Cooperation: Which Came First?
The dialectic of this paper so far has concerned itself with the question of whether Gricean communication preceded cooperative activity, or whether cooperative activity necessarily came first. However, this debate need not be characterised in such black and white terms. The cooperative aspects of communication might increase incrementally. Furthermore, even if we take the behaviour of chimpanzees as suggestive of the possibly uncooperative tendencies of our last common ancestors, we need not assume that such ancestors were totally uncooperative. If that is the case, then that task of explaining the emergence of joint action need not be one of explaining how joint action emerged from a state in which there existed only individual actions. Rather, we can explain conditions under which our ancestors might have become gradually more cooperative. If this is right, then even if a small degree of interpretation were always necessary in Gricean communication, a lexicon of easily interpreted utterance types could still be used to articulate further insights about the value of joint action. In turn, we could still appeal to communication to explain the phylogenetic development of joint action. Even if chimpanzees (and by extension our early hominin ancestors) were unmotivated or only minimally motivated to engage in joint action, then their acquisition of simple communicative devices might still enable a dramatic extension of the cooperative acts in which they willingly engaged. The ‘improbable moral revolution’ that Habermas describes might then be reconceived as a much more gradual, and more probable, moral evolution. 

11.1 Effortful Interpretation in Chimpanzees?
In fact, recent evidence suggests that at least some features of joint action are present in the communicative repertoire of chimpanzees, if only rarely. This evidence is particularly relevant, because it pertains to a case of the interpretation of an ambiguous utterance. 

In a recent study by Yamamoto, Humle and Tanaka (2013), captive chimpanzees were tested in a paradigm that tested their ability to infer one another’s communicative goals. One chimpanzee, call it the ‘communicator’, was placed in a room containing a food dispenser that could be operated using a tool that was not in the room. A second chimpanzee, the ‘donor’, was placed in room containing a box of tools – including the tool that was needed by the communicator to obtain food. The chimpanzees could communicate through a small window in the wall that separated them, which was also big enough for tools to be passed through it. The apes were tested in two conditions. In one the wall between the rooms was transparent, such that the donor could see the tool that the communicator needed. In the second condition, the separating wall was opaque. 

In both conditions, the communicator produced begging gestures at the window. Crucially, the gestures that she produced were ambiguous: since the tools were hidden in a box out of view, she could not point to the tool that she needed. Instead she produced only a begging gesture that did not fully specify the desired implement. As a result, some element of inference would be needed by the donor to correctly identify the communicator’s goal. While in the opaque condition, the donor handed the communicator the correct tool only at chance, in the transparent wall condition, the donor handed over the appropriate tool above chance. This suggests that the donor was able to infer the communicator’s communicative intention. 

Although this finding is clear evidence of pragmatic interpretation in at least a minimal sense, alone it cannot show that the apes in the donor role were engaging in intentional and not automatic interpretation. Nonetheless, a further finding of this study suggests that this requirement was met in at least one case. In the opaque condition, one chimpanzee playing the donor role was observed to climb to a vantage point in the enclosure from where he could get a better look at the equipment that the communicator was using. From there he was able to work out what tools his interlocutor needed, and he handed these tools over accordingly when she gestured. This interaction satisfies the criterion (ii) for communicative joint action identified at the outset, since both communicator and donor clearly acted intentionally in order to realise the communicator’s goal. 

Even if this interpretation of the empirical data is appropriate, we should not expect such cases of joint action to be pervasive in the ape kingdom. In the study just described, success was very likely facilitated by the testing setup. In particular, the room in which the donor chimpanzee was held was very small – such that that individual had little to do in the test setup besides observing and responding to the communicator’s requests. In a similar peer-peer communication study recently conducted between orang-utans, apes tended to be largely uninterested in and unresponsive to their conspecific’s gestures (Moore, Call and Tomasello 2015). A key difference between these studies is likely to have been the much larger test rooms in which the orang-utans were tested, which made it easier for them to ignore one another.​[10]​ Nonetheless, while the test setup used by Yamamoto et al. likely boosted successful interaction between the chimpanzees, the finding that in some cases they engaged in effortful pragmatic interpretation remains. Given this finding, we should perhaps conclude that chimpanzees are capable of undertaking inference-involving forms of joint action, even if they do so only rarely. 

This possibility does not undermine the claim that intentional communication need not be a form of joint action. Rather, it allows us to embrace a more gradualist account of the co-emergence of cooperation and communication. It may be that in a community of largely uncooperative, early and easily interpreted forms of Gricean communication led to an increased awareness of the possibilities that could be achieved through joint action. In turn, the success of these acts led to selection pressures for individuals who were more motivated to attend to one another’s utterances, and who had a greater appreciation of the value of using communication to coordinate. This conjecture would support a boot-strapping account of the co-evolution of gradually more complex (and demanding) forms of communication, and of individuals who were willing to spend time investing in attending to and interpreting the utterances of their peers. 

12. Conclusions
Since there are forms of Gricean communication that require comparatively little pragmatic interpretation, such that the recipients of communicative acts need not be motivated to spend time and effort interpreting others’ utterances, Gricean communication does not require joint action. The Cooperative Communication View is therefore false. 

This conclusion is nonetheless consistent with the possibility that where speaker and hearer engage in joint action, and are able and willing to invest cognitive effort in attending to and interpreting one another’s communicative goals, the possible forms of communication available to them would dramatically increase. Once the capacities and motivations for joint action had taken root in a population, that population might thrive in ways that predecessors had not, due to the proliferation of new tools for social coordination. Thus it is consistent with the view offered here that young children excel at acquiring language because, unlike chimpanzees, they invest time and cognitive effort into inferring the content of a speaker’s message. It is also consistent with the position defended here that a fundamental turning point in hominin phylogeny was our ancestors’ starting to use their existing communicative abilities in pro-social ways. However, the model offered here enables us to consider different possible routes by which a community of cooperative communicators could come into existence. On the story elaborated here, the members of a community might acquire abilities and motivations for joint action through their participation in communicative interaction. This story is – surely – explanatorily more satisfying than an alternative in which such an appreciation could be acquired only independently of communicative interaction. 
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^1	  Many different formulations of the character of joint action have been offered. The version here is similar to Bratman’s (1999), but is simplified for reasons of brevity and relevance. Additionally, while clause (ii) reflects Tomasello’s reading of Bratman, it is stronger that Bratman’s own formulation. 
^2	  Cases of talking to oneself, or to an imaginary audience, constitute counter-examples to this view – but these cases can reasonably be treated as derivative (Avramides, 1989). 
^3	  For an alternative account of the nature of Grice’s second clause, see my ‘Gricean communication and cognitive development’ (submitted). There I argue that the second clause of Grice’s analysis of meaning characterises the way in which a speaker S speakers must (ordinarily) address her utterance to her intended audience, H, if communication is to be successful. Unlike Tomasello and Iankovic, I do not claim that intentional communication requires intentional action on H’s part.
^4	  There are notable differences between Tomasello’s account and that of Sperber and Wilson. For example, the latter are primarily concerned with the pragmatic gap that exists between the meanings of the sentences (determined by their semantic and syntactic properties) and what speakers intend to communicate by uttering. In contrast, Tomasello (2008) is primarily concerned with the interpretation of non-verbal pointing, where a speaker’s goals must be inferred from utterances that (he thinks) lack semantic and syntactic properties. 
^5	  Unlike Tomasello, Jankovic is not committed to any story about the evolution of human communication. Her account is intended to describe only human linguistic interaction. 
^6	  While chimpanzees do produce ‘food grunts’ that alert others to the presence of food, the extent to which these calls are under intentional control is currently debated (see Slocombe et al. 2010 for discussion). Unintentionally produced calls would be cooperative only in a metaphorical sense. 
^7	  Elsewhere I have argued that failure to understand pro-social motivations is unlikely to explain chimpanzees’ comparatively poor pointing comprehension – not least because they do no better at understanding competitively produced points (Tempelmann et al. 2013). A better explanation of why apes find pointing comprehension difficult is that points present poor evidence for a speaker’s message – and so pose considerable challenges for pragmatic interpretation (Moore 2013b). I include Tomasello’s explanation of pointing comprehension failure here in order to best reconstruct the motivations for his Cooperative Communication View, and not because I think it plausible.
^8	  Here I take no stand on the general plausibility of Relevance Theory. See Moore (2014a) for discussion. 
^9	  The gestural communication of chimpanzees and bonobos is sufficiently similar that conclusions drawn from populations of bonobos could be expected to generalise. 
^10	  For an illuminating and pertinent discussion of the constraints that a physical environment imposes on ape communicative interactions, see Leavens et al. (2005).
